APOLLO XIII MISSION: SIX DAYS ALONE TOGETHER By: Gerald Blackburn

APOLLO XIII MISSION: SIX DAYS ALONE TOGETHER

By: Gerald Blackburn

Isolation at half A MILLION miles from earth

Fifty years ago this month we learned the crucial lessons of what a “successful failure was. Apollo XIII showed us surviving skills for managing any crisis. The five “‘ations” Anticipation, Isolation, Communication, Application and Participation.

The NASA Astronauts of Apollo XIII and their support teams showed us how to overcome a crisis and survive.

Apollo XIII Crews Successful Return from a Failed Mission

“Failure was not an option”, Flight Director Gene Kranz

This was the Apollo Programs second failure and third success. The Aquarius and Odyssey, CSM-109 and LM7, made their way through the workflow like the other successful lunar spacecraft’s before. This time, however, Mission 13 would be a different test of everyone’s skills. The same skillful pioneers responsible for Apollo 8 and 11 would now have to use their Technology and skills to avert catastrophe. They would need to anticipate, isolate, communicate, apply and participate in solving the many problems that could save the Astronaut Crew of Apollo XIII.

A Failure Success Story

The current Global Pandemic crisis we are experiencing is an appropriate backdrop to revisit the Apollo Thirteen Mission. Fifty years ago on April 11 we were witness to an almost catastrophic event. Three pioneers isolated for 6 days in an area the size of an SUV, 250,000 miles from home would become the drama for an audience of over a billion citizens. The fascinating coincidences and parallels with other program experiences and today’s Pandemic is an amazing story. After the failure of Apollo One and the loss of three astronauts a second failure and crew loss was unacceptable. This failure would become a success by bringing our astronauts home safely. Once again the pioneering aerospace community would be called upon to solve critical and timely problems with the resources available.

There were warning signs that should have been anticipated. The mission failure would isolate the crew from lifesaving resources. Communication with earth would provide the guidance for the application of a community of solutions. At home a family of global citizens would participate in their success.

Anticipation (THE warning SIGNS)

A retrospection of the Apollo 13 mission indicates the success of a third lunar exploration experience would have seemed to be in jeopardy even before it began.

·         The spacecraft power system was designed for operation at 28 volts. In 1965 NAA was informed of preflight testing by NASA at KSC would use 65 volts. Design engineers directed electrical component suppliers to make design changes for both voltage conditions. One contractor did not get the memo. The oxygen tank thermostat and heater manufacturer never made the design change.

·         At the NAA Downey Facility the #2 oxygen tank installed on CSM-109 (Apollo 13), was accidentally dropped about 2 inches. Inspection and testing found no damaged and the tank was cleared for flight.

·         In late March of 1970 during a NASA Countdown Demonstration Test at KSC, the #2 oxygen tank passed all prelaunch tests, however, attempts to empty the tank of oxygen failed, Ground technicians turned on the internal tank heaters to facilitate venting the oxygen remaining. The thermostat temperature limit was supposed to be 80 degrees F (25C). The 65-volt surge welded the thermostat closed. Tank temperatures increased to 1000 degrees F (500 C) damaging wiring in the tank. This condition remained undiscovered and the mission proceeded to launch.

·         The original crew assignments for Apollo 13 was James Lovell, Fred Haise and Ken Mattingly. Prior to the mission Astronaut Charlie Duke who met with the crew had been exposed to the Rubella Virus. Mattingly who was the only one that had not previously had Rubella Fever was replaced by Rusty Schwigert.

The Saturn V Apollo XIII Spacecraft lifted off from KSC at 19:13:00 UTC April 11, 1970

At 5 1/2 minutes after liftoff, James Lovell, Fred Haise and John Swigert felt a little vibration. The center engine of the S-II stage shut down two minutes early. The remaining four engines continued to burn 34 seconds longer than planned, the S-IVB third stage had to burn nine seconds longer to put Apollo 13 in orbit.

The first two days of the mission were uneventful.

At 46 hours and 43 minutes into the mission, Mission Control, Joe Kerwin reported,” The spacecraft is in real good shape as far as we are concerned. We are bored to tears down here.” The real tears however would begin shortly. It was April 13, 1970.

Isolation (THE FAILURE)

Having just completed a TV broadcast, Fred Haise finished the LM shutdown testing, Jim Lovell was stowing the TV camera and Jack Swigert had a call from Jack Lousma, the Houston Capcom.

The Apollo 13 spacecraft was 210,000 miles from earth.

At 55 hours, 55 minutes, Lousma directed Jack Swigert to activate fans inside the service modules oxygen tanks. When the switch for tank #2 was turned on the damaged wiring initiated a spark causing a fire, rapid tank pressurization and rupture. Guenter Wendt explains, "That thing just cooked and burned up. And that's what caused the thing to blow."

While pure oxygen fed the fire, the pressure inside quickly grew to the point where the tank burst open, at the same time damaging much of the other plumbing inside the densely packed service module and crippling the spacecraft. With the detonation of the oxygen tank the entire bay of the service module was damaged.

For the crew, the message came in the form of a sharp bang and vibration at 9:08 p.m. April 13. Swigert saw a warning light that accompanied the bang and said, "Houston, we've had a problem here." Lovell came on and told the ground that it was a main B bus undervolt.

Next, the warning lights indicated the loss of two of three fuel cells, which were the spacecraft's prime source of electricity. With warning lights blinking, one oxygen tank appeared to be completely empty and there were indications that the oxygen in the second tank was rapidly depleting.

Thirteen minutes after the explosion, Lovell happened to look out of the left-hand window and saw the final evidence pointing toward potential catastrophe. "We are venting something out into the... into space," he reported to Houston. Capcom, Jack Lousma replied, "Roger, we copy you venting." Lovell said, "It's a gas of some sort." It was oxygen gas escaping at a high rate from the second, and last, oxygen tank.

All three of the astronauts on Apollo 13 were test pilots. That experience and those skills would serve them well on this new mission as they faced the most important question, "How to get back safely to Earth?"

The first thing the crew did, even before discovering the oxygen leak, was try to close the hatch between the CM and the LM. They reacted spontaneously, similar to a submarine crew, closing the hatches to limit the amount of flooding. First Swigert, and then Lovell, tried to lock the reluctant hatch, but the stubborn lid wouldn't stay shut. Exasperated and realizing that there wasn't a cabin leak, they strapped the hatch to the CM couch.

At one hour, 29 seconds after the bang, Lousma said after instructions from Flight Director Glynn Lunney, "It is slowly going to zero, and we are starting to think about the LM lifeboat." Swigert replied, "That's what we have been thinking about too."

With only 15 minutes of power left in the CM, Lousma told the crew to make their way into the LM. Haise and Lovell quickly floated through the tunnel, leaving Swigert to perform the last chores in the command module. The first concern was to determine if there were enough consumables to get home. The LM was built for only a 45-hour lifetime and it needed to be stretch to 90. Oxygen wasn't a problem. The full LM descent tank alone would suffice. In addition, there were two ascent-engine oxygen tanks and two backpacks full of oxygen that would never be used on the lunar surface. Two emergency bottles on top of those packs each had six or seven pounds in them. At LM jettison just before re-entry 28.5 pounds of oxygen remained, more than half of what was available after the explosion.

Power also was a concern. There were 2,181 ampere hours in the LM batteries. Ground controllers carefully worked out a procedure where the CM batteries were charged with LM power. All noncritical systems were turned off and energy consumption was reduced to 1/5, which resulted in having 20 percent of LM electrical power left when Aquarius was jettisoned. There was one electrical close call during the mission. One of the CM batteries vented with such force that it momentarily dropped off the line. Had the battery failed, there would have been insufficient power to return the ship to Earth.

The pressure in the No. 1 oxygen tank continued to drift downward; passing 300 pounds per square inch, then headed toward 200 pounds per square inch. Months later, after the accident investigation was complete, it was determined that when the No. 2 tank blew up, it either ruptured a line on the No. 1 tank or caused one of the valves to leak. When the pressure reached 200 pounds per square inch, the crew and ground controllers knew they would lose all oxygen, which meant that the last fuel cell also would die and so would all the power in the command module. It would be a dead spacecraft and all they would have left for s safe haven would be the LM as their lifeboat.

Communication (HOUSTON we have a PROBLEM)

The Astronaut Crew commanding the spacecraft had to rely on an extended support team. The NASA Launch and Operations Team in Florida provided the expertise and resources to send them on their way. The NASA Mission Control Team in Houston Texas were their direct connection with home, planet earth. Through this link they would also have access to the many NASA Contractor support teams such as North American Aviation in Downey California for the CSM Spacecraft and Grumman in Bethesda Maryland for the LM.

This was the same communication network that was utilized during all Lunar Missions.

Apollo 13 Odyssey Spacecraft – Flight Crew; Lovell, Haise, Schwikert

NASA Mission Control Florida, Kennedy Space Center – Capcom Gene Kranz

NASA Mission Control Houston Johnson Space Center- Chris Kraft Jr./ Dale Meyers

NAA Mission Control Downey California, North American Aviation-

Grumman Aircraft, Bethpage New York

Through this network the individual teams became a collaborative resource to the astronauts now stranded in space. Time was a precious factor in resolving the myriad problems everyone faced. Sharing information was critical and the only time zone that mattered was the mission elapsed time clock.

The Apollo XIII Mission had begun with diminishing public interest and little early media coverage. On April 13 1970 that all changed. A nation and the world stopped to focus their attention on the real life drama evolving a quarter of a million miles from earth in lunar orbit. For the first time the novelty of the video technology from space was becoming a pipeline of information about the US Lunar Mission crew and their fate. 

The TV Broadcast was a scheduled mission event that the crew enjoyed sharing with the citizens back at home. Unfortunately, the commercial networks did not share their interest or programing priority, much of the video transmission was limited to direct NASA links.

The Capcom link became the most important communication connection between the crew and ground control. The failure was being analyzed by a thousand experts looking for answers. The Cap Com Team needed to manage all communication to the crew members.

Application (ODYSSEY we have a SOLUTION

Ground controllers in Houston faced a formidable task. Completely new procedures had to be written and tested in the simulator before being passed up to the crew. The navigation problem had to be solved; essentially how, when and in what attitude to burn the LM descent engine to provide a quick return home.

Water was the main consumable concern. It was estimated that the crew would run out of water about five hours before Earth re-entry, which was calculated at around 151 hours. However, data from Apollo 11, which had not sent its LM ascent stage crashing into the moon as in subsequent missions, showed that its mechanisms could survive seven or eight hours in space without water cooling. The crew conserved water. They cut down to six ounces each per day, 1/5 of normal intake, and used fruit juices; they ate hot dogs and other wet-pack foods when they ate at all. The crew became dehydrated throughout the flight and set a record that stood up throughout Apollo: Lovell lost 14 pounds and the crew lost a total of 31.5 pounds, nearly 50 percent more than any other crew. Those stringent measures resulted in the crew finishing with 28.2 pounds of water, about 9 percent of the total.

Removal of carbon dioxide was a major concern. There were enough lithium hydroxide canisters, which remove carbon dioxide from the spacecraft, but the square canisters from the command module were not compatible with the round openings in the lunar module environmental system. There were four cartridges from the LM and four from the backpacks, counting backups. However, the LM was designed to support two men for two days and was being asked to care for three men for about four days. After a day and a half in the LM, a warning light showed that the carbon dioxide had built up to a dangerous level. Mission controls at KSC, Houston and Downey evaluated solutions using only materials the crew had available on board the spacecraft’s. A solution was found to attach the CM canisters to the LM system by using plastic bags, cardboard and to tape all materials carried on board.

One of the big questions was, "How do we find our way home? " The LM navigation system wasn't designed to help in this situation. Before the explosion at 30 hours, 40 minutes, Apollo 13 had made the normal midcourse correction, which would take it out of a free-return-to-Earth trajectory and put it on a lunar landing course. Now the task was to get back on a free-return course. The ground computed a 35-second burn and fired it five hours after the explosion. As they approached the moon, another burn was computed; this time a long five-minute burn to speed up the return home. It took place two hours after rounding the far side of the moon.

The command module navigational platform alignment was transferred to the LM, but verifying alignment was difficult. Ordinarily the alignment procedure uses an onboard sextant device, called the Alignment Optical Telescope, or AOT, to find a suitable navigation star. Then with the help of an onboard computer, it verifies the guidance platform's alignment. However, due to the explosion, a swarm of debris from the ruptured service module made it impossible to sight real stars. An alternate procedure was developed to use the sun as an alignment star. Lovell rotated the spacecraft to the attitude Houston had requested and when he looked through the AOT, the sun was just where it was expected. The alignment with the sun proved to be less than 1/2 a degree off. The ground and crew then knew they could do the five-minute engine burn with assurance, cutting the total time of their voyage to about 142 hours. At 73 hours, 46 minutes into the mission, the air-to- ground transcript describes the event:

Lovell: OK. We got it. I think we got it. What diameter was it?
Haise: Yes. It's coming back in. Just a second.
Lovell: Yes, yaw's coming back in. Just about it.
Haise: Yaw is in....
Lovell: What have you got?
Haise: Upper-right corner of the sun....
Lovell: We've got it! If we raised our voices, I submit it was justified.

Flight Director Gerald Griffin, a man not easily shaken, recalled: "Some years later I went back to the log and looked up that mission. My writing was almost illegible; I was so damned nervous. And I remember the exhilaration running through me: My God, that's the last hurdle - if we can do that, I know we can make it. It was funny because only the people involved knew how important it was to have that platform properly aligned." Yet Griffin barely mentioned the alignment in his change-of-shift briefing - "That check turned out real well" is all he said an hour after his penmanship failed him.

The trip was marked by discomfort beyond the lack of food and water. Sleep was almost impossible because of the cold. When the electrical systems were turned off, the spacecraft lost an important source of heat. The temperature dropped to 38 degrees Fahrenheit and condensation formed on all the walls.

The most remarkable achievement of mission control was quickly developing procedures for powering up the CM after its long, cold sleep. Flight controllers wrote the documents for this innovation in three days, instead of the usual three months. The command module was cold and clammy at the start of power-up. The walls, ceiling, floor, wire harnesses and panels were all covered with droplets of water. It was suspected conditions were the same behind the panels. The chances of short circuits caused apprehension, but thanks to the safeguards built into the command module after the disastrous Apollo 1 fire in January 1967, no arcing took place. Lovell recalled the descent to Earth, "The droplets furnished one sensation as we decelerated in the atmosphere: it rained inside the CM."

Four hours before landing, the crew shed the service module; mission control had insisted on retaining it until then because everyone feared what the cold of space might do to the un-sheltered CM heat shield. Photos of the service module showed one whole panel missing and wreckage hanging out, it was a mess as it drifted away. Three hours later, the crew left the lunar module Aquarius and then splashed down gently in the Pacific Ocean near Samoa.

Participation (WELCOME HOME)

 Lovell commented, “Nobody believes me, but during this six-day odyssey we had no idea what an impression Apollo 13 made on the people of Earth. We never dreamed a billion people were following us on television and radio, and reading about us in banner headlines of every newspaper published. We still missed the point on board the carrier Iwo Jima, which picked us up, because the sailors had been as remote from the media as we were. Only when we reached Honolulu did we comprehend our impact: there we found President Nixon and [NASA Administrator] Dr. Paine to meet us, along with my wife Marilyn, Fred's wife Mary (who being pregnant, also had a doctor along just in case), and bachelor Jack's parents, in lieu of his usual airline stewardesses.”

Worldwide interest in the Apollo program was reawakened by the incident; television coverage of which was seen by millions. Four Soviet ships headed toward the landing area to assist if needed,[144] and other nations offered assistance should the craft have to splash down elsewhere.[145] President Nixon canceled appointments, phoned the astronauts' families, and drove to NASA's Goddard Space Flight Center in Greenbelt, Maryland, where Apollo's tracking and communications were coordinated.[144]

The rescue received more public attention than any spaceflight to that point, other than the first Moon landing on Apollo 11. There were worldwide headlines, and people surrounded television sets to get the latest developments, offered by networks who interrupted their regular programming for bulletins. Pope Paul VI led a congregation of 10,000 people in praying for the astronauts' safe return; ten times that number offered prayers at a religious festival in India.[146] The United States Senate on April 14 passed a resolution urging businesses to pause at 9:00 pm local time that evening to allow for employee prayer.[144]

An estimated 40 million Americans watched Apollo 13's splashdown, carried live on all three networks, with another 30 million watching some portion of the six and one-half hour telecast. Even more outside the U.S. watched. Jack Gould of The New York Times stated that Apollo 13, "which came so close to tragic disaster, in all probability united the world in mutual concern more fully than another successful landing on the Moon would have".[147]

Epilog (MISSION SUCCESS)

WHAT HAPPENED TO THE CREW?

All the crew members returned safely to earth with no injuries.

None of the Apollo 13 astronauts flew in space again. Lovell retired from NASA and the Navy in 1973, entering the private sector. Swigert took a leave of absence from NASA in 1973 and left the agency to enter politics, being elected to the House of Representatives in 1982, but died of cancer before he could be sworn in.  Haise flew the Space Shuttle Approach and Landing Tests before retiring from NASA in 1979.

Apollo 13 was called a "successful failure" by Lovell  It has been repeatedly called, "NASA's finest hour" .  Author Colin Burgess wrote, "the life-or-death flight of Apollo 13 dramatically evinced the colossal risks inherent in manned spaceflight. Then, with the crew safely back on Earth, public apathy set in once again. “

IMPROVISATIONAL TECH

William R. Compton, in his book about the Apollo Program, said of Apollo 13, "Only a heroic effort of real-time improvisation by mission operations teams saved the crew." during the pause after Apollo 13, Four more Apollo Missions were flown without incidents. The program ended with Apollo 17 in December 1972.

The Apollo 13 Command Module Odyssey on display at the Cosmo sphere in Hutchinson, Kansas

The successes of Apollo 8 and Apollo 11 united the world into a global community that shared in those accomplishments. Because of that, the potential failure of Apollo Mission 13 was an international concern that rallied the attention everyone around the globe. Three of our own world citizens were in harm’s way a half a million miles from home.

From 1962 to 2000, The North American Aviation Spaceship Factory in Downey California served as America’s Cradle for the Cosmic Age. People from all over this nation came together to explore beyond our world, not to make weapons of war but the tools of learning and discovery. Spacecraft, to take us to new worlds and new possibilities. A great team was formed that rallied around our nation’s leader and his vision of what we could do with our resolve. We met that goal and went beyond with even greater dreams. Dreams that have been forgotten and replaced with visions of new priorities.  Apollo 13 was one of the stories that almost became a tragedy. It was because of the skills of the pioneers who created the successes of Apollo that we not only saved the astronaut crew of Apollo 13 but added valuable lessons learned for our programs in the future. Other stories remain to be told and many of these same lessons can be a hopeful foundation for our current crisis.

Gerald Blackburn

North American Rockwell Engineer

About The Author:

Gerald is a native southern Californian who had a forty year plus career in Aerospace Engineering. He began at North American Aviation in 1962 and has worked on the X-15, the XB-70 Valkyrie, Apollo, Saturn SII, Apollo ASTP and Space Shuttle Programs. He has also participated in the public education community as a local school board member, teacher, and STEM curriculum designer. After retirement in 2003, he helped create the Aerospace Legacy Foundation and presided as president for several years. He has published the recent book, “Downey’s Aerospace History” by Arcadia Publishing. He is Founder and CEO of Tinkers Corner LLC and a member of the Columbia Memorial Space Center Foundation Board of Directors. You might have seen him or heard him in some of the recent documentaries celebrating Apollo’s 50th anniversary on CBS, NBC, Discover, History, Science, PBS American Experience, PBS https://www.kcet.org/shows/blue-sky-metropolis or the Apollo Chronicles. You also might have heard him as commentator during the long slow ride of the Endeavour shuttle to her new home in California. You can see his interview on YouTube: https://youtu.be/XXSgOtYOV6Q Images and Some editorial material courtesy of NASA. Article Copyright G.A. Blackburn April 2020